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Abstract 
Post-Communist openings constituted the ideal foci for reimagining the relationship between the 
state and religion. Specifically, it created new opportunities to balancing between rules of 
inclusion and exclusion regarding contending and sometimes exclusionary religious alternatives 
of ‘good life’. In line with their new democratic aspirations, all Balkan countries have gradually 
reshuffled their religious policies, formalized religious freedoms, and institutionalized a more 
equal playing field for their respective religious communities. Realizing an all-inclusive and 
equal-opportunity structure for all religious denominations, however, proved neither smooth nor 
automatic, especially when it came to the inclusion of the historically-marginalized Muslim 
populations. The evolving institutional choices to incorporate such communities vacillated 
between the democratic urge for religious freedoms and equality, on the one hand, and the role of 
founding traditions and heritage of majority privileges, on the other. This article outlines the 
institutional compromises to accommodating Islam across plural polities which feature an 
unusual mix of denominations –Muslim, Christian Orthodox, Roman Catholics as well as atheist 
and agnostic groups –in the post-Communist Balkans. 
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Introduction to the Topic and Questions  
 
The collapse of Communism and its restrictive policies towards religion led to new institutional 
models for regulating the relationship between the state and its respective religious 
communities.
1
 The remodelling of this relationship involved a search for the most appropriate 
institutional mechanisms to liberalize, but also to regulate, the revived religious phenomenon. 
Indeed, post-Communist openings constituted the ideal foci for balancing among the rules of 
inclusion and exclusion of comprehensive religious visions. The liberalization of religion, 
moreover, led to increased religious activity, including significant ‘direct foreign investment’ 
from different international movements that brought with them new tensions and dilemmas.
2
 The 
search for institutional accommodation of religion also manifested itself in other countries, 
which were still struggling to deepen their democratic freedoms, beyond the post-Communist 
realm. The revised democratic choices culminated in various solutions, which vacillate between 
religious accommodation, on the one hand, and restriction of their activities and public influence, 
on the other.  
 
Nowhere have these choices been more challenging and complex than in post-Communist 
Balkan countries, which all feature diverse religious populations including Muslims, Orthodox 
Christians, and Roman Catholics, as well as atheists and agnostics. Here, moreover, the collapse 
of Communism coincided with the rise of exclusive nationalisms and/or the violent redefinition 
of borders, all of which exacerbated deep-rooted divisions between ethno-religious 
communities.
3
 Nonetheless, the normalization of political conflicts alongside ongoing processes 
of democratization, often with substantial support from the international community, encouraged 
large-scale institutional reforms to recognize religious freedoms, instil state neutrality, and 
accommodate social plurality. In line with their new democratic aspirations, all Balkan countries 
have gradually reshuffled their religious policies, formalized new religious freedoms, and 
installed a more equal playing field for their diverse constituents.  
 
Realizing an all-inclusive and equal-opportunity structure for all religious denominations, 
however, was neither smooth nor automatic.
4
 Re-regulating the relationship between the state 
and Muslim communities proved especially complicated in the context of exclusive national 
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paradigms, long-running ethno-religious animosities, oft-fabricated collective memories, and the 
inherited majoritarian ‘traditions’.5 Reversing dominant perceptions of Islam as a backward 
remnant of Ottoman occupation, almost a traitor amidst the aspired modern, European and often 
homogenously Orthodox nation-state constructions, was even more challenging.
6
 In fact, the 
post-Communist Balkans came to be randomly seen as typical cases where ‘the national 
historical traditions are often at odds with the liberal egalitarian-universalist principles.’7 Hence, 
the institutional rehabilitation of Muslim communities resulted in untidy trade-offs between the 
democratic urge for religious freedoms and equality, on the one hand, and the ‘traditional’ 
legacies of nation-state formation and the privileges it connoted in each case, on the other.  
 
Such compromises certainly involved walking a fine line between alternative solutions – 
inclusion and exclusion, rights and constraints, separation and collaboration, equality and 
privileges. Interestingly, but perhaps not surprisingly given the dominant narratives of national 
uniformity, exclusive and/or majoritarian-biased readings of tradition became an important 
appendix of emerging models of state-mosque relations after Communism. In line with the 
overall objectives of this special issue, this article outlines the range of institutional solutions for 
regulating Islam across plural democratic societies. Specifically, the article introduces the 
general topic and outlines a common framework to analyse subsequent cases. The argument 
proceeds in three sections. Section I charts the institutional tools for accommodating religion, 
particularly Islam, in democratic societies. Section II summarizes the legacy of state-building 
and the possible clashes between traditional privileges and universal democratic rights across the 
Balkan states. Section III introduces the empirical case studies and presents some of the findings.  
 
 
Democratic Tools of Inclusion and Exclusion   
 
To the dismay of many liberals, perhaps, religion cannot be cleansed from democratic public 
space without oppressing many contenders. Neither can religion be allowed unrestrained sway 
over public space if citizens from different walks of life are to perceive the state as their own. 
Reaching a balance between accommodation and restraint is especially thorny in plural societies 
that include different denominations, competing formulas of what constitutes a good life, and 
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alternative ways of belonging. The only way for such fragmented polities to reach an 
‘overlapping consensus’ and live together in peace is inclusion, but also restrictions on citizens’ 
various pursuits of good life so that no specific vision dominates the others.  
 
The inclusion of religion as a particular, and often exclusive, vision of good life, and the limits 
states place upon it, are subject to a proliferating body of literature on models and experiences of 
secularism. Different formats of secularism seemingly share a common goal, at least formally – 
namely that no citizen will be disadvantaged or discriminated against on the grounds of his/her 
religion and beliefs.
8
 Nonetheless, the concrete institutional solutions and specific policies to 
reach the goal of non-discrimination differ from case to case. Moreover, the theoretical 
assumptions underlying each model are subject to contestation. Classical theories of 
secularization hold that a ‘wall of separation’, even a certain laïcité-style hostility, between the 
state and religion, is necessary for a plural democratic life to flourish.
9
 Recent approaches to 
(post-)secularism, by contrast, emphasize that the modalities of separation between state and 
religion emerge out of dynamic interactions and different historical compromises between the 
two.
10
 Secularism as such is a socio-political construct, which develops in tandem with the 
specifics of the context where it applies. It is the country-specific conditions, which ultimately 
result in differences regarding regulation of religion, namely who is included and excluded, 
under what terms, and with what results.  
 
In any case, ‘[s]ecularism in some form is a necessity for the democratic life of religiously 
diverse societies’.11 Differentiation between political and religious authority, necessarily hints at 
the need for regulating different spheres of authority and a certain state involvement in order to 
ensure that such regulations are indeed respected. The state plays a crucial role in setting these 
borders, mediating between contending alternatives of good life, and supervising an ‘overlapping 
consensus’ that allows competing ‘comprehensive doctrines’ to share a common political space. 
The democratic mechanisms or the regulation of religion in general, and Islam in particular, 
evolve around three institutional dimensions: (1) religious rights, (2) the principle of neutrality 
and (3) historical traditions. The solutions and necessary trade-offs that characterize real-world 
choices represent different combinations of these dimensions.  
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Religious Rights 
 
The allocation of religious rights is usually the first and most explicit form of inclusion and 
exclusion. Religious rights develop along two tracks: an individual track and an organizational-
level or collective/corporatist track.
12
 The first track has to do with the protection of 
‘fundamental’ individual rights of religious belief and practice. It dovetails neatly with the 
negative, rights-based conception of freedom promulgated by liberal institutions. The most 
pristine form is captured in the Jeffersonian metaphor of ‘the wall of separation’ and rooted in 
‘establishment’ and ‘free exercise’ clauses of the First Amendment of US Constitution. The 
approach has arguably enabled a relatively smooth integration of Muslims in the United States. 
The challenge here is religious demands, which arise out of religious or cultural specificities and 
clash with basic principles of human rights. Such specificities call for additional regulatory 
measures and pose the challenge of ‘reasonable’ accommodation of religious beliefs and 
practices. Equally challenging are the rights of individuals to opt out of their religious affiliation 
and related restrictions, which entails a dilemma between freedom of religion and freedom from 
religion.
13
 
 
The organizational/institutional track recognizes that religious practice acquires a collective 
dimension, and, therefore, endows religious denominations with organizational rights. Yet, in 
contrast to individual rights, organizational rights are slower and more difficult to attain; 
although this also depends on the historical compromises that mark the emancipation of the 
modern state from the stronghold of the church. The organizational track involves some 
measures of institutional autonomy for religious organizations. Often, it also endows recognized 
organizations with a public status that facilitates collaboration between them and the state and 
grants them a public function. In the case of German model, for example, religious organizations 
with public law status are ‘closer’ to the state than ordinary religious associations, and they 
become enlisted in ‘pursuing the common interest in the public realm’.14 The special privileges 
that come with corporate status represent an offer granted by the state only when an organization 
is capable and willing to take up public functions that are in the interests of the state. In other 
words, selected corporate associations develop a kind of partnership or cooperation with the 
state, which others are denied. Liberal democratic states across Europe have attempted similar 
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corporatist solutions in order to bring Muslims within the fold of the state. By creating Islamic 
councils – intermediary bodies or interlocutor organizations that operate under state brokerage – 
most European countries have gradually established mechanisms of incorporation and 
collaboration with various Muslim groups that are willing to do so.
15
  
 
Balancing individual rights and collective/organizational privileges is often a delicate choice 
between individual freedom of belief and organizational dimension of religious practice and 
status. The dilemma is especially relevant in the post-Communist cases that struggle to 
institutionalise new religious freedom. As a Kyrgyz state official dealing with religious affairs 
explains: ‘The situation is a complex one: on the one hand there is a freedom of conscience; on 
the other the need to legally regulate what the religious organizations and missionaries are 
doing… We need new laws … to keep within limits those religious organizations that may 
change … traditional religious preferences…’16 The perceived need for regulation here evokes 
both the issues of religious ‘establishment’ and ‘traditional heritage’, both representing helpful 
institutional tools in supervising a certain  ‘overlapping consensus’ amongst alternative visions. 
 
Equidistant State 
 
State neutrality, another core dimension of secularism, is closely related to the promotion of 
religious freedom and equality, but draws attention to the functions of the state in outlining and 
upholding these rights in an impartial manner. In its simplest form, a neutral state maintains a 
position of equidistance between its citizens’ various deep-seated ‘moral convictions’ and what 
sort of life they should lead. This implies institutionalizing parity among religious beliefs and 
even-handedness of the state in granting them similar guarantees of equality and non-
discrimination. However, neutrality, as a principle of statecraft rarely denotes simple hands-off-
neutrality, and even less so total state indifference towards ‘conflicting’ alternatives of the good 
life. Using the metaphor of the referee, Palomino suggests that the state in fact serves as an 
arbiter that fulfils a specific role in interpreting and applying the rules of the game in order to 
ensure a fair play between opponents.
17
 The notion of positive neutrality, which stresses the 
requirement of state action, is rooted in the description of the liberal state as one that does not 
side with an ‘ethical’ conception of the good life, but still enables its citizens to pursue their own 
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conception of the good in their own way. This obliges the state to demarcate areas of activity that 
fall outside the ‘reason’ of the state, and to provide autonomy to religious organizations. 
However, it also requires the state to come up with political arrangements and institutional 
procedures that prevent any one group from imposing its view on the society as a whole, and 
hence, a ‘neutrality of intervention’. Positive neutrality ultimately pits individual freedoms 
against collective concerns and state regulations on behalf of the common good.  
 
A corollary of state-active neutrality is what Bhargava calls ‘political secularism’, which is an 
open, negotiated and continuously-evolving constellation of religious freedom and restrictions.
18
 
In the Indian version, which best exemplifies the concept, the state is not exactly separate from 
religion, but rather maintains a ‘principled’ distance from all religions and safeguards the 
ongoing political compromises between different parties. The state’s equidistance involves equal 
protection, state support and selective interference in religious practices that conflict with the 
state’s non-negotiable goals such as equality, liberty and socio-economic development. From the 
perspective of democratization and state-building studies too, a degree of state intervention is 
necessary to maintain stability and peace as common goods. The democratic state cannot be 
neutral towards principles of democracy, equality, human rights, and peace. Neither can it detach 
itself completely from the heritage of state-church relations that implant specific compromises 
and sometimes denominational biases in different models of state-church relations.
19
 The legacy 
of historical foundations renders relevant the role of ‘tradition’ and the institutional forms that it 
takes in shaping secular constellations in specific countries. 
 
The Role of Tradition 
 
The country-specific heritage, and institutional elements that it introduces in real-world systems, 
are closely related to the historical conflicts and bargains that characterize state-church relations 
in each respective country. Frequently, these legacies go back to the founding moment of the 
nation-state, when the secular establishment replaced the old types of religious regimes. The 
founding settlements leave an ideological and institutional legacy that persists over time.
20
 As 
Fetzer and Soper note, political disputes over religion will inevitably play out through state-
church relations inherited from the past.
21
 Such historical patterns distinguish at least three 
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different models of state-church relations and respective legacies: the ‘open’ political secularism 
that is experimented with in India; the ‘separatist’ civic-Republican tradition that is born in 
France; and the corporatist or even  established national church regime that developed in most 
European countries.  
 
The establishment of independent India amidst communal violence was a major factor that urged 
the founders of the state to attend to the claims and anxieties of various religious communities. In 
order to assure all minorities that found themselves within the new state, the Indian state-builders 
opted for a policy of non-established religion along with extensive and equal religious freedoms 
for all communities. 
22
 The founding choices also included vague and ambiguous constitutional 
assertions on religion, a kind of an open-ended political secularism, which would allow the state 
and the communities to continuously negotiate their relations. The constitution ultimately left it 
to the political process to fine-tune the actual scope of religious rights.
23
 The process allowed 
communal groups to determine their own cultural-religious practices, expand spheres of religious 
autonomy and bring religion into the public sphere by allowing individuals to display markers of 
their religious identity. However, the ample pool of permitted religious rights was not without 
limits. Aside from restrictions on the basis of ‘public order, morality and health’, the legal 
framework provided for state intervention regarding activities associated with religious 
practices.
24
 Most Indian states established state offices to regulate the affairs of respective 
religious institutions, including their day-to-day administration and management.  
 
In Western Europe, secular choices were grounded in the modern political project to discipline 
religion through the division of private and public spheres, whereby religious matters were 
assigned to the private and secular issues to the public. Already after the Westphalian settlement 
that ended long conflicts over religion and its influence, the state took the reins of absolute 
political sovereignty over its territories.
25
 The confinement of religion to the private sphere, 
helped legitimize the state’s seizure of sovereignty with reference to the primacy of secular 
reason over particularistic beliefs. Despite the common insulation of politics from religious 
authority and influence, even Western states followed different trajectories in envisaging their 
state-church arrangements. In the famous French case, the revolutionary civic-Republican 
tradition, and its origins in the Enlightenment idea of emancipation from religious dogma, 
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shaped a model of laïcité de combat, which insisted upon a hostile and clear separation between 
state and church, at least initially. Accordingly, the state accorded equal individual freedoms and 
organizational autonomy to particular denominations; however, it took an interventionist 
approach in order to keep religion out of politics and supervise expressions of faith in the public 
domain.  
 
The more corporatist model adopted elsewhere in Europe originated in the conflict of post-
reformation religious wars and the way in which they were settled. The corporatist solutions 
draw on the liberal provision of an ‘independent political ethic’ as the main principle of 
organizing a religious-free public domain. Still, the corporatist state reached for a ‘public 
settlement’ that allowed different sects to coexist. Accordingly, the state recognized religious 
freedoms and maintained neutrality, while tolerating, if not spelling out a public role for, specific 
confessions. Hence, ‘concordatarian’ European regimes allowed selected churches institutional 
privileges and the possibility to negotiate their status through bilateral agreements with the 
state.
26
 In the ‘national church’ version, only one of the churches received preferential legal 
and/or financial treatment, often in return for political links and state interference. Corporatist 
arrangements, be it concordatarian or an exclusive national church, enable the state access to 
powerful organizations that help the much sought for national and cultural cohesion. 
 
Aside from overt or subtle means for supervising national cohesion employed by European 
states, it is germane to note that such polities also consisted of rather homogenous ethno-cultural 
‘peoples’ and a common Christian cultural stripe, which inserted clear majoritarian cultural and 
religious impulses during the process of European nation-state formation. All modern states 
aspire towards single and uniform identities. Religious populations are also ready-made 
communal units, which lend themselves to easily-controlled social uniformity. Indeed, during the 
process of European nation-state formation, confessional units were used as a badge of political 
loyalty and belonging. Emerging links between states and specific confessional entities, 
organizations and symbols helped to merge confessions and nation, religion and identity, faith 
and culture, and ultimately, to achieve national unity. Such interconnections, however, hollow 
out the comprehensive meaning of state neutrality and religious equality in multi-religious, but 
still deep-rooted national cultures that carry the stench of history.
27
 The weight of nation-specific 
10 
 
legacies and ‘biases’ pops up in almost all contemporary European countries that strive to 
incorporate relatively newly-arrived Muslims in their social and cultural fabric. According to 
Ferrari, the renegotiated European model of state-church relations converges towards religious 
liberty, state neutrality and selective cooperation.
28
 While religious liberty and state neutrality are 
increasingly uniform ‘offers’ of the democratic state to all its citizens, the so-called selective 
cooperation is laden with nation-specific cultural biases, including traditional charges, identity 
policies and a common public ethic.
29
 The heritage of the past, thus, informs political-religious 
alliances, which might undermine an all-equal and all-neutral public sphere towards new-coming 
religious communities, especially at the collective level of religious freedoms. The challenges of 
accommodation of Islam, then, boil down to whether and how the historically informed states 
can eschew their cultural-laden ‘biases’ in favour of a wider and renewed consensus of ‘common 
good’.    
 
 
Past Legacies and New Democratic Aspirations  
 
In the South-Eastern corner of Europe, post-Communist demands for the extension of religious 
rights and equality coincided with the violent dissolution of Yugoslavia. The creation of new 
states and the reshuffling of borders in the early 1990s once again brought fundamental concerns 
over national homogeneity, uniform identities and state loyalty en vogue, with all the subsequent 
dilemmas concerning who ought to belong to the nation and what to do about it. The emerging 
nation-states’ actual identification with one ethno-religious majority, its symbols and narratives, 
moreover,  emphasized the role of religion as a marker of collective identities and categorical 
divisions between and among nations.
30
 Claims of unity and loyalty inherent in the nationalist 
movements ultimately clashed with competing demands for universal values of plurality, 
religious freedoms and a neutral state. Interpretations of the past that underlined a ‘thick’ 
religious justification of the national self, and who was to be part of it, became  a key barrier to 
universal expansion of religious freedoms. Such exclusive interpretations of legacies, culture and 
tradition, moreover, were often resuscitated from post-Ottoman founding period of nation-state 
formation.  
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Legacies of Nation-State Formation and the Contested Role of Islam  
 
Balkan states that carved themselves out of the former Ottoman territories during the 18
th
 and 
19
th
 centuries aimed at emulating the ‘modern’ European ideal of sovereign, homogenous nation-
state organization.
31
 As Todorova famously puts it, ‘the Balkans [became]… European by 
shedding the last residue of an Imperial legacy, widely considered an anomaly at the time and by 
assuming and emulating the homogenous nation-state as the normative form of social 
organization.’32 State entrepreneurs’ anxiety about uniform identities and central state authority, 
however, contrasted with the legacies of religious divisions, mixed allegiances and overlapping 
loyalties inherited from the multi-religious and multi-ethnic Empire. In response to the 
uncomfortable mixture of their populations, most Balkan states adopted the confession of the 
majority, including related motifs, narratives and symbols, in order to construe a collective past 
and destiny. Specifically, Serbia, Greece, Romania, Montenegro, Bulgaria, and partly Bosnia, 
self-identified with the Orthodox ‘unit’ in order to imagine cohesive bordered nations.33 The 
links between the Orthodoxy and newly-created nation-states divided Eastern Christendom into a 
myriad of autocephalous churches, each promoting a strong symbiosis and congruence between 
religion, nation, culture and traditions. The links stabilized clear ‘markers’ on who was entitled 
to membership into the nation, but they also provided the ‘essence’ of the aspired ‘we-ness’, in 
terms of a past, character, identity, mission and destiny.
34
 Muslim-majority countries like 
Albania and Turkey, which were too Muslim to embrace a religious-essence distinct from the 
Empire, sought to build national cohesion through other means. The ‘ecumenical’ version of the 
nation in Albania and Kemalist principles in Turkey envisaged a secular unity, which actually 
diluted religious influence and the role of the Islamic majority in particular.
35
  
 
Throughout the process of nation-state formation, religious freedom and state neutrality 
remained abstract concepts, especially when it came to the treatment of Muslim populations. 
Islam, the official religion of the Ottoman Empire, became the very backbone of national 
engineering. Centuries of confrontation between European and Islamic armies also inculcated a 
broader Europe-wide conception of Islam as a symbol of invasion and devastation by hordes of 
barbarians, which posed a constant danger to Christian ‘civilization’ at least until early 18th 
century. Sketches of European history as a series of battles against Islam were certainly an 
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important strategy in the construction of a European identity, until the more recent constructions 
of a cosmopolitan identity.
36
 Balkan populations that had been subject to centuries of Ottoman 
rule had even more reasons to construct a narrative of their identity that was distinctly separate 
from the Islamic ‘hordes’. Hence, the new Balkan states came to see the inherited Muslims as a 
kind of traitor amidst the aspiring European, modern and often exclusively Orthodox nations.
37
 
Policies towards Muslim populations enshrined such anti-Muslim attitudes: negation of basic 
rights, marginalization, measures of homogenization, exchange for better-suited populations and 
at best toleration as a distinct minority. Even Albania and Turkey, both with a Muslim majority, 
renounced Islam as a source of backwardness and initiated large scale reforms to catch up with 
modern ‘European times’ where these states now belonged.38  
 
Muslim communities themselves were not impervious to reform. During processes of nation-
state formation, Muslim intellectuals and believers wrestled with questions of European 
modernity, civilizational progress, issues of independence, national struggles and the creation of 
modern state institutions. Groups of like-minded ulama and intellectuals began to present Islam 
in modern reformist language, mixing Islamic discourse with rational concepts, nation-state 
contingencies and ideas of European progress and civilization.
39
 Not all Muslims were eager to 
give up the privileges they enjoyed during the outgoing Empire or embrace new modern ideals. 
However, the fact that Muslims in the region encountered modernity through normal socio-
political and cultural exchanges rather than a forced colonial project, facilitated genuine bottom-
up engagement with ideas and proposals for reform. Such modernization was not new, but had 
been attempted already during the late Ottoman period as a way of escaping the socio-political 
maladies of the empire, giving credibility and longevity to calls for reform.
40
 It was these 
reformist groups and individuals that ultimately played a crucial role in persuading their societies 
of the necessity to reform and catch-up with changing circumstances of their times.  
 
The experience of nation-state formation under the guise of European templates of nation-state 
organization left Islam deeply intertwined with powerful discourses of state formation, national 
unity, European modernity and civilizational progress. Yet, the founding period of nation-state 
formation became a malleable field of interpretations and back and forth exchanges between 
various actors with competing views.  Such debates necessarily lent themselves to overlapping 
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and sometimes contradictory narratives on the role of Islam in the process of nation-state 
building and collective memories of that period. Hence, history, culture and tradition came to 
connote different things to different groups, depending on where they sat in the hierarchy of the 
nation-state, experiences of the past and projections of the future. In other words measures of 
homogeneity, majoritarian impulses, anti-Islamic policies, and/or reformist Islam meant different 
things to different sections within the state. 
 
Democratization, the Search for Homogeneity and Carriers of Tradition 
 
The competing narratives of ‘tradition’ came to the fore during battles over state authority, 
power and territory that followed the dissolution of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s.
41
 This time, 
the process of imagining uniform cultural-religious units was especially problematic given the 
interwoven fabric of identities in former Yugoslavia. The resulting transformation of such units 
triggered a violent process that Verdery calls the ‘extermination of alternative identity choices’.42 
Similar to the past, Islam was often at the very core of ‘extermination’ strategies and majoritarian 
cultural-religious biases that characterized the battle for homogenous nations.
43
 Thick cultural-
religious interpretations of the past proved useful and were enforced by a powerful coalition 
merging post-Communist state entrepreneurs, state intelligentsias and nationalized religious 
hierarchies, which were all active to forge and control national homogeneity. 
 
Political elites across the post-Communist space proved extremely active in attempting to 
‘nationalize’ but also ‘centralize’ and ‘manage’ fledging Islamic impulses within the framework 
of the central state authority.
44
 Nationalization-cum-etatization often served state interests in 
using faith at the service of concrete political agendas.
45
 Mastering clear criteria for inclusion 
and exclusion was especially pertinent in light of the centralized legacy of former Communist 
regimes. Communist states, to a lesser or greater extent, had created a highly centralized state 
machinery in order to appropriate all spheres of life, including public religions and intimate 
spheres of personal piety.
46
 Succeeding post-Communist states capitalized on the power of the 
central state apparatus in order to select and use religious symbols as an anchor of legitimacy. 
Institutionally, the state continued to closely control religious life by preserving a hierarchy of 
religions as well as a multi-tiered system of registration, according to unilaterally revocable 
14 
 
conditions.
47
 Political management of Islam depended on the demographic and political context 
in each political unit, but the use of state muscle to discipline it remained relatively constant.  
 
Former state intelligentsias – historians, linguists, ethnographers, writers, artists and students of 
Marxist ideology generously funded by the former Communist state – played a crucial role in 
checking ‘appropriate’ religions at the door of nation-states. As Bougarel puts it, ‘the communist 
period favoured the development of intellectual elites, who in turn became the standard bearers 
of new national aspirations’48 It was these former intelligentsias that fanatically guarded their 
nations’ post-Communist ‘cultural heritage,’ complete with a pantheon of thinkers, artists and 
heroes. That the Communist-era intellectuals took over key positions in the institutional 
production of knowledge after the regime change in the 1990s enabled the continuation ‘of a 
school-mediated, academy supervised [national] idiom’.49 In the wide spectrum of supervised 
Balkan nationalisms, Muslims were repeatedly portrayed as an ethnic ‘fifth column’, a leftover 
from a previous era, who conspired against the uniform nations. As Carmichael argues, in the 
case of Serbia ‘[Scholars specializing in Oriental Studies] contributed considerably to making 
hostility towards the Muslim community intellectually respectable.’50 The circulation of national 
paradigms together with official oft-fabricated accounts of history, thus, contributed to enforce 
stagnant parameters on how nation, tradition and Islam merged or parted ways in the collective 
memory of each political entity. The securitization of Islam and the definition of ‘otherness’ 
easily tapped into such exclusive accounts of histories and the anti-Islamic penchant of 
discourse. 
 
At the same time, the churches in the region pushed for privileges based on historical alliances 
and traditions. For the churches, it is often a rational strategy to strive for privileged access to 
government sources and policymaking, instead of engaging in outright competition.
51
 Historical 
alliances between nation-states and Orthodox churches informed new ‘traditional’ privileges 
and/or favoured statuses for the latter. Other denominations, including Islam, however, also 
insisted on restoring ‘traditional’ privileges through the recognition of a hierarchy of 
denominations, monopoly of authority, and/or links with political office-holders. To paraphrase 
the findings of a previous study, Balkan states were able to exert influence over religious life 
‘through the privileged status given to Orthodoxy, […] and through the close administrative and 
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financial links existing between state authorities in charge of religious affairs and religious 
hierarchies’.52 All countries in the region have constituted centralized umbrella-type Muslim 
organizations that enjoy exclusive authority in running administrative and spiritual affairs of the 
Muslim community. The new legal systems award centralized Muslim hierarchies with 
privileges including special recognition, representation in state institutions, public funds, and 
state protection.
53
 The central ‘establishments’, in return, are expected to collaborate with the 
state, enforce community oversight and maintain the historical ‘tradition’ often defined in line 
with the modernist trends that developed in the course of nation-state formation.
54
 This 
realignment amongst the Muslim establishment and government institutions enables the 
development of ‘official’ Islam, an organization term connoting intimate connections, indeed 
some form of institutional and ideological accommodation between history, tradition and 
nationalized communities under the watch of the state.  
 
Not all groups of believers that flourish in the autonomous spaces of the Islamic civil society 
concede to the boundary-drawing categories of nation, culture and tradition. Neither do they 
support unconditionally the institutional collaboration between state and religious hierarchies to 
maintain the ‘official’ traditional line. Believers perceive Islam as faith, not as an appendix of 
culture, tradition or collective uniformity. They do not necessarily reject the concept of national 
traditions or consider non-practicing neighbours as ‘infidels’, but they strive for a religious 
attitude towards the world that insists on the free practice of religious beliefs. Moreover, they can 
avail of newly-acquired religious rights and a myriad of external ‘offers’ to learn about their faith 
outside of the official religious channels. Open communication with the world allows believers 
to discover Islam in unrestricted and unconventional ways, which incorporates both vertical and 
horizontal networks of transmission.
55
 The Internet represents a particularly easily accessible tool 
to avail of different sources of information and knowledge. One must also acknowledge the 
substantial ‘direct investment’ of the global Islamic movements into the local religious scene, 
which includes, inter alia, ample missionaries, generous funds, scholarships to study at 
renowned centres of Islamic theology, free translations of Islamic literature, numerous 
periodicals, different opportunities for religious education, and proselytizing activities. Such 
external influences confront believers with alternative offers of faith, including radicalized 
theologies and militant movements. Whereas the ‘thick’ cultural interpretations of ‘we-ness’ as 
16 
 
articulated by the political, intellectual and religious guardians of nations might represent a 
straitjacket for believers’ individualized searches for faith, not all of the new encounters, 
discoveries and practices of Islam that permeate the ‘open market’ of ideas after Communism are 
amenable to a common plural democratic life. Some ‘comprehensive doctrines’ of ‘Islamic’ life 
might threaten other citizens’ freedom to practice different beliefs and/or pursue their own 
versions of the good life. Yet others may undermine the ‘minimal consensus’ or necessary 
common denominator such as principles of human rights, security and public order, that holds 
plural societies together. Hence, democratic states face the challenge of balancing between 
majoritarian, and often exclusive, biases of state-building, new provisions of religious freedom 
and guarantees of state neutrality towards all ‘comprehensive’ doctrines, in order to maintain a 
shared plural home for all.  
 
 
Institutional Choices to Accommodate Islam after Communism 
 
The subsequent case studies explicate how democratizing countries – Bulgaria, Bosnia, Albania 
and Turkey – weighed up such dilemmas and managed Islam in the context of plural, complex 
and historically-shaped national constructions. All the empirical case studies deal with similar 
questions concerning the regulation of Islam amidst democratic claims for equal rights, on the 
one hand, and old majoritarian or traditional biases, on the other. Each empirical study, however, 
necessarily delves into idiosyncratic problems and issues that arise in that specific context. The 
combination of common comparative and theoretically-driven questions with in depth empirical 
analysis enables us to outline common findings while paying attention to case-specific details, 
similarities and differences. 
 
In the context of democratization, all countries analysed here have moved to broaden the range 
of religious freedom and equality guarantees for their respective religious communities, 
including historically marginalized Muslim populations. Post-Communist countries, which 
experienced wholesale regime change and re-envisaged new relations between the state and 
religion, were particularly successful in introducing new legal standards of religious freedom and 
equality for all their citizens. In Bulgaria, the new democratic parliament restored Muslim names 
17 
 
and the 1991 Constitution institutionalised the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of 
religion, while formalizing individual and organizational religious rights.
56
 The Albanian 
parliament has also swiftly recognized the universal right of religious practice immediately after 
the fall of the regime in 1991, although it failed to adopt more specific regulations to this end 
until 1998.
57
 Post-war Bosnia stands out as an exception, which, after a devastating war that left 
behind deep-rooted religious animosities, institutionalized the highest level of internationally-
recognized religious freedom and multiple equality guarantees for all the denominations.
58
 At the 
other end of the spectrum is Turkey, where the Muslim-rooted governing party, AKP, called for 
the rehabilitation of the oppressed religious ‘other’. Actual reforms undertaken by AKP-majority 
government since 2002, however, only expanded the rights of Sunni sectors of the population, 
often at the expense of other religious or non-religious sections of plural Turkish society.
59
  
 
The cases under analysis also highlight the difficulties and dilemmas that come with the 
installation of global democratic freedoms in post-authoritarian contexts. Some of these 
dilemmas hint at the ongoing clashes between new democratic values and less egalitarian 
practices and/or majoritarian ‘biases’ of nation-state traditions. In Bulgaria, the Orthodox Church 
is distinguished as the traditional religion of the Republic and is also awarded specific privileges 
in relation to procedures of registration, distribution of state funds, and the allocation of 
construction permits. Similarly, in Bosnia, favourable treatment towards the dominant religion 
has managed to survive the introduction of principles of state neutrality, at least at the 
decentralised level of administrative entities, with each entity privileging its respective majority, 
either Christian Orthodox or Muslim. In Albania, the unrestricted institutionalization of religious 
freedoms also resulted in preferential treatment of the Sunni majority until the 1998 Constitution, 
asserted the principle of state neutrality and provided a more equal play field for all 
denominations. The persistent promotion of Sunni-biased values in state-funded education in 
Turkey reveals that majoritarian inclinations are hard to handle and exist in both Orthodox- and 
Muslim-majority contexts. Such ongoing biases show that states are not only contingent 
formations that capitalize on the majority as a means of enforcing unity and control, but they also 
continuously appropriate historical ‘traditions’ and select relevant religious symbols and 
memories in order to construe a bordered and cohesive national unity.  
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Other dilemmas related to the introduction of democratic values of religious freedom and 
equality arise also from the perspective of believers’ individualized searches and discoveries of 
faith. From Bulgaria to Bosnia and Albania, the formalization of religious freedom triggered the 
fragmentation of the Islamic scene into autonomous groups of faithful, which sometimes 
complement but other times compete with the ‘official’ traditional strand of Islam in terms of the 
organization structure, relations to the state, and religious doctrine. All cases analysed in this 
special edition hint to the fact that at least some of those ‘discoveries’ contest the anti-Islamic 
biases of tradition and cultural interpretations of faith, but also some of the minimum criteria 
necessary to share a plural home with others who pursue different visions of the good life. 
Turkey is probably an exception because the exlusive Sunni impulses, which hinder the idea of a 
common plural home, have gained strength under the lead of the AKP’s governing project. 
Whether calling for introduction of sharia law, isolating themselves into separate enclaves, 
expressing resentment against West, or supporting global jihad, some fringe Muslim groups 
challenge the very proposition of a common pluralist home for all.  
 
For the sake of enforcing homogeneity or safeguarding a plural democratic home, all of the 
countries analysed herein have also resorted to regulating and supervising the evolution of the 
fragmented Islamic scene. Specifically, they have opted for restrictions on the scope of religious 
activity, the strengthening of supervisory state mechanisms and the privileging of official 
religious interlocutors that serve at the interface of the state and the community. In all our cases, 
religious communities enjoy a wide range of religious freedoms, but not without limits such as 
the need to respecting third parties’ rights and upholding non-negotiable goals, including 
national security, public order, health as well as common democratic aspirations of human rights 
and democracy. The cases under study have also adopted various forms of institutional checks on 
and cooperation with selected official organizations, which are granted public privileges in return 
for their contribution to the common good. These mechanisms of collaboration and control serve 
the state in screening competing religious ideas, strategies and projects in order to ensure a 
common democratic home for all.    
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